Danish company law (Selskabsloven) and association law do not require votes to be cast in person or on paper. What they require is that votes are verifiable, that the person voting can be established, and that results are documented. Assembley records each of those things; whether a particular assembly was validly convened and held is for the organisation and its advisers to determine.

The evidence package is digital documentation of participation, voting rights and voting results, and cryptographically verifiable evidence of the recorded meeting data. What weight any particular record carries in a particular proceeding is for a court or a lawyer to determine, not for us to assert.

Danish law does not require in-person or paper voting. It requires verifiability, a record of who voted, and documentation. Assembley records all three.

The evidence package exported from every Assembley assembly contains a complete event log with timestamps and cryptographic hashes, individual vote records tied to verified identities on standard items (for secret-ballot items, participation and the ballot set without the individual choices), presence against the quorum figure you configured, Merkle root verification per agenda item, and a SHA-256 hash chain covering all events.

This package is a self-contained, tamper-evident record. If any event in the chain is modified after the assembly, the hash chain breaks at a detectable point, making tampering detectable at the first altered event. The chain is a SHA-256 hash chain, not a digital signature: it proves the recorded data has not been altered since it was written, and it does not attest to who signed anything.

Yes. When a voter casts a secret ballot, their browser shows them a verification code to save. After voting closes, they can find that exact code in the published record and confirm their ballot was counted, without revealing how they voted.

The code is deliberately non-transferable: it cannot prove their choice to anyone else, so it gives a vote-buyer or someone applying pressure nothing to verify. Each voter can confirm their own ballot is in the count, while an outside auditor can verify the tally as a whole, with no identity revealed.

No. Votes are append-only, enforced at the PostgreSQL database level by a trigger that blocks every DELETE on the votes table, and every UPDATE except removing the voter's name after an erasure request or at the end of retention. This applies to all database users, including Assembley administrators. It is not a policy control. It is an architectural constraint that cannot be bypassed by application code.

Additionally, every vote is included in a SHA-256 hash chain. Any modification to any vote record would break the chain at a detectable point. The Merkle root for each agenda item is stored separately and can be used to verify the integrity of the vote set independently, without access to Assembley systems.

Votes are append-only, enforced at the database level by a PostgreSQL trigger, not by access controls or policy. No user, including Assembley, can change a submitted choice or delete a vote.

Voters need only an email address and a device with a web browser. There is no app to download, no account to create, and no password to remember. Each voter receives a unique, single-use ballot link by email. The link opens their ballot, and in an invited meeting they also enter the meeting code the chair shows during the meeting.

Each link works once and expires 24 hours after the scheduled meeting time, or 7 days after sending if no time is set. Every invitation email includes a short “How to vote” section for voters who are less at home with technology.